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ABSTRACT 
The first three parts of this research paper analyses the balance between the 
competing human rights, namely the right to health (also the right to life and 
development) of the individuals affected by the lack of access to HIV/AIDS 
drugs, as against the property rights of the pharmaceutical companies 
manufacturing such drugs. In particular, the paper firstly explores whether the 
access to treatment and HIV/AIDS drugs, namely ARY medications, is a human 
rights issue and whether it forn1s part of the international human right to health . 
Secondly, the paper considers whether lawful actions by pharmaceutical 
corporations, acting within their property rights, such as blocking access to or 
making it difficult to access such treatment and drugs in developing nations, are 
in violation of the international human right to health. In respect to this, the 
paper looks at a case study and analyses the arguments advanced by the 
pharmaceutical industry in support of its stand on this issue. Finally, the paper 
shows how a balance may be struck between both those rights. The next part of 
this research paper considers the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 
relation to the right to health (including access to HIV/AIDS treatment) and 
patent matters. In particular, this section of the paper studies the WTO 
agreements, especially the TRIPS Agreement, and its dispute settlement process. 
Recent decisions declared by the WTO with regards to the interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement and public health matters are also considered here . Lastly, the 
paper attempts to show that a relationship between human rights and the WTO 
can be formed. The final part of this research paper looks at the role of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) in improving access to HIV/AIDS treatment 
to developing countries. In particular, the steps already taken by the WHO and 
the steps to be taken to improve access to such treatment are considered, 
including having input in future WTO international trade agreements involving 
international public health matters. 
WORD COUNT 
The text of this paper (excluding cover page, abstract, table of contents, 
footnotes and bibliography) comprises approximately 14,774 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The access to pharmaceutical drugs and treatment needs of the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 1 infected and acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS)2 diagnosed persons in the developing part of the world provides 
an emotional battleground for fundamental human rights issues, such as the right 
to life and the right to health of those persons against the intellectual property 
rights of pharmaceutical companies that own the patents to those various 
HIV/AIDS medication. In most discussions about HIV and AIDS today, 
particularly about HIV/ AIDS and intellectual property, human rights receive very 
little attention. Human rights law is a recognised body of law, just like intellectual 
property law. However, despite its power, a human rights framework is seldom 
used to analyse the forces fuelling the pandemic and to devise appropriate 
responses to them. 3 
According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) and the World Health Organisation ' s (WHO 's) December 2003 
Global Summary of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic,4 forty million people in the world 
today are living with HIV/ AIDS. Sub-Saharan Africa remains by far the region 
worst-affected by the HIV/ AIDS epidemic. In 2003, an estimated 26.6 million 
people in the sub-Saharan region were living with HIV, including the 3.2 million 
who became infected during the year 2003 itself. AIDS killed approximately 2.3 
million people in 2003 . In sub-Saharan Africa, HIV prevalence has remained 
relatively steady, generally at high levels, for the past several years across much 
of the region. This is due to the fact that high levels of new HIV infections are 
persisting and are now matched by hi gh levels of AIDS mortality. 
1 HIV is a retro virus spread by the exchange of bodily fluids through non-casual contacts, such as 
intrauterine contact, contact during birth, breastfeeding, intravenous needle contamination and 
sexual intercourse. It attacks the immune system of its host, crippling the body's defense 
mechani sms over time and rendering it susceptible to various opportunistic infections. See 
<htlp:i/w\~ w.cdc.gov/hivlf.!enera l.htm#cause> (last accessed 20 December 2003) . 
2 AIDS is a diagnos is made by a phys ician using certain clinica l criteria, like presence of AIDS 
indicator illnesses or spec ific CD4+ counts. See <http://www.cdc.gov/hivigcneral.htm#causc> 
(last accessed 20 December 2003). 
3 See generall y Leonard S Rubenstein " Human Rights And Fair Access To Medica tion" (2003) 17 
Emory Int ' l L Rev 525. 
4 UNAIDS/WHO AIDS Epidemic Update, December 2003, ava ilable at 
<http:/·\,\\,\\\. who. ml.hi, ;pub,epitkmiolof.!v:cn 'cpiupdate1 003 I en.pd!> (last accessed 7 February 
2004). 
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Many of the AIDS related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa could have been 
prevented through the provision of comprehensive HIV/AIDS care, in particular 
antiretroviral treatment. Since the advent of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy 
(HAART) in 1996, antiretroviral (ARY) medicines have dramatically reduced 
AIDS mortality and morbidity in developed countries, where such drugs are 
widely accessible.5 The drugs are not a cure but they prolong life, suppress or 
prevent the entry of the virus into cells, and allow people living with HIV to 
continue their productive lives, to contribute to their families, their communities, 
and the social and economic life of their societies. Unfortunately, the vast 
majority of people living with HIV do not have access to HAART or even to more 
basic HIV care services. In Africa today, only 50,000 people, representing about 
one percent of the four million in urgent need ofHAART, are on treatment. 6 
There is a raging debate about why these people, who are in dire need of 
life saving medicines, are not receiving HAART. Underdeveloped healthcare 
infrastructure, lack of HIV testing, lack of trained medical personnel, lack of 
education and lack of prevention and follow-up programmes are amongst the 
many arguments proffered. However, the largest single debate is focused on 
whether patent protection of those life saving pharmaceuticals in those developing 
countries (that is, the issue of affordability) is the primary or key obstacle to 
access to AR V drugs. 
Patent protection plays a key role in promoting economic growth by 
offering incentives for investment in the development of new products. In fact, 
one of the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), the most comprehensive 
multilateral international instrument on intellectual property, is that all member 
nations grant patents for any invention in all fields of technology, including 
pharmaceutical drug inventions. A patent grants its owner certain exclusive rights, 
such as the right to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, 
5 Dr Timothy Mastro "The Global Fight Against HIV and AIDS - Current State Of The Global 
Epidemic" (2003) 17 Emory Int ' l L Rev 413, 418. 
6 Julian Fleet "UN Approach To Access To Essential Aids Medications, Intellectual Property Law 
And The WTO TRJPS Agreement" (2003) 17 Emory Int ' l L Rev 451 , 452 & 453. 
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selling or importing the invention without the patent holder's consent.7 Patents, 
thus, create temporary monopolies for their owners. This outcome is justified as a 
means to allow investors to recoup the costs of product development. 
Patents serve as a barrier to market entry. One of the key determinants of 
pharmaceutical costs is the patent-status of a product. The TRIPS Agreement 
significantly altered the status quo of the patentability of pharmaceuticals. Before 
the TRIPS Agreement came about, many developing countries, who are now ~ 
signatories to the TRIPS Agreement, did not have patent protection laws for 
pharmaceuticals. Developing countries which had the manufacturing capacity to 
produce pharmaceuticals, for example India and Brazil, were thus able to supply 
their populations with generic drug products, pre-TRIPS. However, with the 
introduction of pharmaceutical patent protections into these formerly unrestricted 
markets, drug prices significantly increased, inevitably blocking access to 
essential drugs, as they were no longer affordable. 8 
The ARV drugs that are widely patented in Africa tend to be those for 
which demand is highest for reasons of both cost and efficacy. For example, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) highly recommends using AZT and 3TC 
drugs together, branded as Combivir by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), as the fist two 
of a standard "first-line" three-drug combination in developing countries. 
According to a study, the Attaran-White paper,9 this 1s the most frequently 
patented AR V medicine in Africa, covered by patents 111 thirty seven African 
countries. As for the third drug in the cocktail, the non-nucleoside reverse 
transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI) nevirapine (NVP), branded Viramune by 
Boehringer Ingelheim (BI), it is the cheapest in generic form. According to the 
Attaran-White paper, that key medicine (Viramune) for poor countries is blocked 
by patents in twenty-five African countries. 10 
7 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects oflntellectual Prope1ty Rights (TRlPS), Article 28. 
8 Kelley A Friedgen "Rethinking The Struggle Between Health & Intellectual Property: A 
Proposed Framework For Dynamic, Rather Than Absolute, Patent Protection Of Essential 
Medicines" (2002) 16 Emory lnt'l L Rev 689, 695. 
9 Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White "Do Patents For Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access To 
AIDS Treatment In Africa?" (200 l) 286 JAMA 1886-1892. 
10 Sean Flynn "Legal Strategies For Expanding Access to Medicines" (2003) 17 Emory Int'l L Rev 
535 , 540. 
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According to a non-profit United States (US) based organisation, the 
Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech), in South Africa, a combination of 
AZT + 3TC + NVP costs over US$2,000 a year at private sector wholesale prices 
(about US$750 for public sector). Generic versions can be purchased for US$200-
$400, including in three-drug fixed dose combinations (FDC) with all the 
medicines in a single pill. Such a three-drug FDC is not available from the brand 
companies because they do not cross license their products. South Africa has a 
gross domestic product per person of about US$3000 a year and a HIV prevalence 
rate of about 4.7 million people (about ten percent of the population). The median 
household income is only about US$ I OOO a year. It is fair to say that the US$2000 
price tag for ARV drugs in South Africa, and the US$750 public sector price, puts 
the drugs far out of reach of most people in need. 11 
The first three parts of this research paper analyses the balance between 
the competing human rights, namely the right to health ( also the right to life and 
development) of the individuals affected by the lack of access to ARV drugs, as 
against the property rights of the pharmaceutical companies manufacturing such 
drugs. In particular, the paper firstly explores whether the access to treatment and 
HIV/ AIDS drugs, namely AR V medications, is a human rights issue and whether 
it forms part of the international human right to health. Secondly, the paper 
considers whether lawful actions by pharmaceutical corporations, acting within 
their property rights, such as blocking access to or making it difficult to access 
such treatment and drngs in developing nations, are in violation of the 
international human right to health. In respect to this, the paper looks at a case 
study and analyses the arguments advanced by the pham1aceutical industry in 
support of its stand on this issue. Finally, the paper shows how a balance may be 
struck between both the rights, that is, between the right to health ( encompassing 
the right to access HIV/ AIDS treatment) and the right to property (intellectual 
property rights). 
11 Sean Flynn "Legal Strategies For Expanding Access to Medicines" (2003) 17 Emory Int'l L Rev 
535, 540 & 541. 
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The next part of this research paper considers the role of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in relation to the right to health (including access to 
HIV/ AIDS treatment) and patent matters. In particular, this section of the paper 
studies the WTO agreements, especially the TRIPS Agreement, and its dispute 
settlement process. Recent decisions declared by the WTO with regards to the 
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement and public health matters are also 
considered here. Lastly, the paper attempts to show that it is possible to form a 
relationship between human rights and the WTO. 
The final part of this research paper looks at the role of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in improving access to HIV/ AIDS treatment to developing 
countries. In particular, the steps already taken by the WHO and the steps to be 
taken to improve access to such treatment are considered, including having input 
in future WTO international trade agreements involving international public 
health matters. 
II. ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the two primary human rights conventions, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and 
its two Optional Protocols. 12 
Adopted on 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Universal Declaration) contains the whole range of human rights within 
one consolidated text. While it is not a fonnal treaty, the Universal Declaration 
has a special legitimacy in international law. The ICCPR and the ICESCR are 
12 Details of the International Bill of Human Rights can be found at the website of the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights <http:,. \~ W\~ .unhchr.ch/html menu6 121fs2 .htm> (last 
accessed 12 Febmary 2004). 
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legally binding on those states that ratify them, obligating those states to respect, 
protect and fulfil the rights enshrined in the conventions. 13 
A. The Specific Human Rights at Issue 
Human rights activists and commentators argue that access to affordable 
HIV/ AIDS drugs is a human right or is a component of other internationally 
guaranteed human rights, such as the rights to health, life, development and 
enjoying the benefits of scientific progress. In 1946, WHO declared the right to 
health a fundamental human right. Subsequently, the Universal Declaration 
enshrined the right to health as a fundamental human right, and the ICESCR later 
legally obligated signatory States to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health. 14 
The preamble to the WHO Constitution provides, among others, that "The 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition." 15 Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration 
affirms that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services ... " 16 The ICESCR, by virtue of 
Article 12, obligates State parties to "recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." 17 
As the contours of the right to health are ill-defined in international law, it 
1s unclear whether the right to health under international law specifically 
encompasses the right to access HIV/ AIDS medications/affordable drugs. As 
stated above, the Universal Declaration recognizes that "Everyone has the right to 
13 See <http: ' \vww.unhch r. ch.ihtmLmenu6 '2/ fs2. htm> (last accessed 12 February 2004). 
14 See generally Lissett Ferreira "Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights 
Obligations Of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations" (2002) 7 1 Fordham L Rev 11 33, 
1162. 
15 See <bJ..!n :/1 )() licv.who.int/cg i-
biniom isap i_il ll ?hits erhcadin , on&infobase bas icdoc& rccord 19D;_;j &.'iQ tipagc= Doc umcnt42 
> (last accessed 15 December 2003). 
16 See <h ttp :f ,, \\ v\ .unhchr.ch/udhr, lang/cng. htm> (last accessed 18 February 2004). 
17 See <h ttp :i: v\ v\ w. unhchr.ch:ntrnl mcn u3, bia cescr.htm> (last accessed 18 February 2004). 
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... medical care." Additionally, the ICESCR requires States to take necessary steps 
to achieve full realisation of the right to health, such as "the prevention, treatment 
and control of epidemic ... diseases" 18 and "the creation of conditions which 
would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness." 19 Thus, many activists and scholars argue that "access to medicines is 
an essential part of access to health".20 
Several recent developments suggest that the right of access to medical 
treatment may be a component of the right to health. For example, the United 
Nations (UN) Committee that supervises the implementation of the ICESCR has 
interpreted the right to health guaranteed in the ICESCR to include the rights to 
treatment of epidemic diseases, access to affordable health services, and the 
provision of essential drugs. In its General Comment 14, the Committee further 
specifies that States' duties to protect the right to health include "the duties ... to 
adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care 
and health-related services provided by third parties", as well as to "ensure that 
third parties do not limit people's access to health-related information and 
services."21 Whilst the committee's interpretations are not legally binding, they 
may, however, be said to have considerable legal weight. Thus, some scholars 
argue that State signatories to the ICESCR have a binding obligation to protect 
and promote the right to health by guaranteeing affordable health care, including 
"d' d 22 prov1 mg access to rugs. 
Furthermore, the UN Commission on Human Rights has passed a 
resolution recognising that access to HIV/ AIDS medications is "one fundamental 
element for achieving progressively the full realization of the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health".
23 
18 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culh1ral Rights, Article 12(2)(c). 
19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culhtral Rights, Article 12(2)( d). 
20 Lissett Ferreira "Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations Of 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations" (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev 1133, 1162 & 1163. 
21 See E/C.12/2000/4, CESCR General Comment No. 14, paragraph 35, available at 
<blJ: :;i www.unhchr. ch/tbs/doc.ns U8c9c603 f-l 86ccl f83802566fflQQ3, 70,;,7 !40d00990 I 358b(k2c 12 
~691 5005 090bc?OpcnDocumcnt#3 .> (last accessed 12 February 2004 ). 
22 Lissett Ferreira "Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations Of 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations" (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev 1133, 1163. 
23 Resolution entitled "Access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS" 
E/CN .4/RES/2 00 2/3 2 
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The resolution further calls on States to pursue policies to ensure the availability 
ofHIV/AIDS medications. 
Most recently, the UN revised and updated its International Guidelines on 
HIV/ AIDS and Human Rights "to reflect new standards in HIV treatment and 
evolving international law on the right to health."24 The new revised Guideline 6 
specifically asserts that States should "take measures necessary to ensure for all 
persons . . . the availability and accessibility of quality goods, services and 
information for HIV/ AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support, including 
antiretroviral and other safe and effective medicines ... "25 
In addition to these developments under international law, there is also 
recent domestic case law defining the right to health to include the right to access 
HIV/ AIDS drugs/treatment. In Cruz Bermudez, et al v Ministerio de Sanidad y 
Asistencia Social, the Venezuelan Supreme Court held that the national 
government violated the right to access HIV/ AIDS drugs by failing to provide its 
citizens with those drugs. 26 In that case, the court reached its holding that the right 
to health included the right to access to treatment by taking into account both the 
Venezuelan Constitution and unspecified "international legal principles."27 
Similarly, the South African High Court held that the national government 
breached the right to health by failing to provide HIV/ AIDS treatment to pregnant 
women who are HIV positive, in order to prevent mother-to-child HIV 
transmission.28 However, unlike the court in Cruz Bermudez, the South African 
court reached its holding that access to HIV/AIDS drugs was a right to health on 
<http :i/www. unhchr.clv1rnridocda/huridoca. ns tJ{S ymbol)!E.CN A . R ES .2002.32. En?Opendocumen 
p (last accessed 12 Febrnary 2004). 
24 HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines, Third International Consultation on 
HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Foreword, page 5 <htt :;. WW\\ .un hc hr.c h hiv, 06. d t> (last 
accessed 12 February 2004). 
25 HIV/AIDS and Human Rights International Guidelines, Third International Consultation on 
HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Revised Guideline 6, page 14 <http:: lww,, .unhchr.chihi v1g6.pd f> 
(last accessed 12 February 2004). 
26 See generally Mary Ann Torres "The Human Right To Health, National Cou11s, And Access To 
HIV/AIDS Treatment: A Case Study From Venezuela" (2002) 3 Chi J Int ' l L 105. 
27 Mary Ann Torres "The Human Right To Health, National Courts , And Access To HIV/AIDS 
Treatment: A Case Study From Venezuela" (2002) 3 Chi J Int'l L 105, 111. 
28 See Treatment Action Campaign & Others v The Minister of Health & Others, No. 2182/2001 
(unreported) <http :· w,, w.tnc .on.ua> (last accessed 2 November 2003). 
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the basis of the South African constitution alone, and did not explicitly recognize 
access to HIV/ AIDS treatment as an internationally guaranteed right. 
29 
According to one commentator, in addition to the right to health, other 
internationally guaranteed human rights may be linked to access to affordable 
HIV/ AIDS treatment. 30 During the controversy in South Africa, for example, 
human rights activists linked the right to access HIV/AIDS drugs to the right to 
life. Under Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, "Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and the security of person."31 Further, Article 6(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that "Every human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life". 32 In its general comment interpreting the right to 
life in the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that the: 
33 
[R]ight to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression 
' inherent right to life ' cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, 
and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In 
this connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for State 
parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase 
life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnuh·ition and 
epidemics. 
Access to HIV/ AIDS drugs may also be tied to the right to development. 
The right to development is guaranteed in the Universal Declaration, which 
specifies that "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights ... set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised."
34 Moreover, the 
Declaration on the Right to Development35 further defines the right to 
29 Ferreira, above, 1164. 
3° Ferreira, above, 1165. 
3 1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3 <htt ://www.unhchr.ch 'udhr/ lang.en~.htm> 
(last accessed 12 February 2004). 
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6( I) 
<http: !/www.unhchr.ch/html · mcnu31b. a ccpr.htrn> (last accessed 12 February 2004). 
33 Sixteenth Session (1982), General Cornn1ent o. 6, Article 6 of the ICCPR 
<b.!,m://www.hshr.org/G-:n\:ral 0 j120Commcnt'}o20Fiks1[CC'PR_ G('6.htrn> (last accessed 15 
February 2004). 
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 28. 
35 Declaration on the Right to Development, GA res 41 /128, aru1ex, 41 UN GAOR Supp (No 53) at 
186, UN Doc A/41 /53 ( 1986) <http:.'i www 1.umn.cdtu humanrts instree •s3drd.htm> (last accessed 
15 February 2004). 
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development, recogmzmg the right to development as "an inalienable human 
right,"36 and giving States the right and duty "to formulate appropriate national 
development policies ... on the basis of ... the fair distribution of the benefits 
resulting."37 Specifically, the Declaration on the Right to Development urges 
States to take all of the necessary steps to ensure "equality of opportunity for all in 
their access to ... health services."38 
Similarly, some argue that "to give effect to [the rights to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits] dictates, at the very least, the need for 
reasonable exceptions to protection that allow for research and development by 
third parties."39 The right to share in scientific progress is also guaranteed under 
international law. For example, Article 27(1) of the Universal Declaration states 
that "Everyone has the right . . . to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits." Similarly, the ICESCR guarantees all persons the right "To enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications."40 Access to HIV/AIDS drugs 
and treatment, which exist as a benefit of scientific progress, is thus necessary for 
the realisation of the right to health and the highest attainable standard of health. 
41 
B. Counter Arguments to the View that the Right to Health Includes 
Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs 
The development thus far of the interpretation of the right to health, as an 
international legal principle, to include access to HIV/ AIDS drugs and treatment 
has not been without controversy. Arguments have been advanced to reject the 
notion that the right to health includes access to medications. These arguments are 
analysed below. 
36 Declaration on the Right to Development, above, A11icle I (I). 
37 Declaration on the Right to Development, above, Article 2(3). 
38 Declaration on the Right to Development, above, Article 8( I). 
39 Ferreira, above, 1166. 
40 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15( I )(b ). 
41 Barbara Cochrane Alexander "Lack of Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Developing Countries: ls 
There a Violation of the International Human Right to Health? (2001) 8 Hum Rts Br 12, 13. 
14 
In the Venezuelan case mentioned above (the Cruz Bermudez case), the 
Venezuelan Ministry of Health rejected the accusation that the government 
violated the plaintiffs' rights to life, health and access to scientific advances 
protected under Venezuelan law. The Ministry's main defence rested on 
economics, that is, that the government could not pay for ARY therapy and 
related medicines for all Venezuelan people living with HIV and/or AIDS because 
such expenses would be impossible to sustain. The Ministry pointed to 
programmes on HIV/ AIDS prevention it had started, for example, distributing 
information booklets and condoms and implementing a 'safe sex' initiative, as 
evidence that it was fulfilling its obligations toward health under Venezuelan law 
given its financial constraints.42 
In the Cruz Bermudez case, however, the Ministry of Health's arguments 
regarding the financial difficulties of increasing access to ARY therapies did not 
hold water, as with arguments frequently advanced by governments in connection 
with questions about their commitment to the right to health under international 
law. Under the ICESCR, the right to health is to be achieved progressively, and 
the determination about how resources are allocated in this progressive project is 
left to the responsible individual governments. In the Cruz Bermudez case, the 
Ministry of Health argued that it was progressively achieving improvements in 
connection with HIV/ AIDS under the budget constrains it faced as a health 
ministry in a developing country.43 
According to one commentator, the Ministry of Health's arguments in the 
Cruz Bermiidez case echo much of what experts have faced in dealing with the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic since the 1980s. This pandemic highlights the problems that 
economic, social and cultural rights confront as elements of contemporary 
international law. Inadequate financial resources, unequal and uneven economic 
development, poverty, social injustice and other problems endemic in the 
developing part of the world have fuelled the HIV/ AIDS pandemic and severely 
42 Mary Ann Torres "The Human Right To Health, ational Courts, And Access To HIV/AIDS 
Treatment: A Case Study From Venezuela" (2002) 3 Chi J lnt'l L 105, 110. 
43 Mary Ann Torres "The Human Right To Health, National Courts, And Access To HIV/AIDS 
Treatment: A Case Study From Venezuela" (2002) 3 Chi J lnt'l L I 05, 111. 
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constrain what the governments of developing countries can do to respect, protect 
and fulfil the right to health.44 
There are several reasons why governments in developing countries are 
reluctant to equate access to HIV/ AIDS drugs as a right to health and therefore 
slow to implement proven public health strategies to respect, protect and fulfil the 
right to health. Absence of committed political leadership and inadequate funding 
are some of the examples. 
The South African President, Thabo Mbeki, as pointed out by one 
commentator,45 exemplifies the inaction of some leaders. Mbeki has questioned 
whether HIV actually causes disease, stating, "[y]ou cannot attribute immune 
deficiency solely and exclusively to a virus." Such scepticism of science by a 
respected political leader seriously undermines HIV/AIDS education and 
prevention. President Mbeki has also openly doubted the accuracy of his own 
Department of Health estimates of the national HIV prevalence among pregnant 
women. The data, based on annual unlinked, anonymous HIV surveys among 
women attending antenatal clinics, demonstrate a thirty-fold increase in HIV 
prevalence, from 0.7% in 1990 to 22.4% in 1999. For several years, the Ministry 
of Health, under President Mbeki, resisted full implementation of UNAIDS 
guidelines for short-course antiretroviral therapy for pregnant women, even 
though it had been demonstrated to be cost effective in South Africa.
46 
Fortunately, as further pointed out by the same commentator, there have 
been competing voices about the dangers of political inaction from the African 
National Congress.47 Former South African President Nelson Mandela observed: 
"Nothing threatens us more today than HIV/AIDS. AIDS is a scourge threatening 
to undo all the gains we made in our generations of struggle." More radically, the 
Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, the South African province most affected by 
44 Torres, above, 111. 
45 Lawrence O Gostin "The Global Reach of HIV/ AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics, And 
Research" 17 Emory Int'I L Rev 1, 23 . 
46 Lawrence O Gostin "The Global Reach of HIV/AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics, And 
Research" 17 Emory lnt ' l L Rev 1, 23. 
47 Lawrence O Gostin "The Global Reach of HIV/ AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics, And 
Research" 17 Emory Int'l L Rev I , 23 & 24. 
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HIV/ AIDS, declared that he would distribute drugs to pregnant women with 
AIDS, in direct violation of central government policy. Further, the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa drastically altered government policy in the 2002 court 
case, Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 
(TAC), when it upheld a request by TAC to provide nevirapine (NVP), an 
antiretroviral drug available to the government free of charge, to pregnant mothers 
at public hospitals.48 
III. ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
As pointed out above, access to HIV/AIDS drugs and treatment, or lack 
thereof, highlights the tension that exists between the protection of intellectual 
property rights and the rights of HIV/ AIDS victims to be provided with access to 
the drugs/treatment. Manufacturers of essential medicines hold patents on the 
drugs they produce and are able to charge unreasonable and unaffordable prices 
for their products. Patent protection also leads to the untenable situation where 
governments cannot ensure that these drugs are produced at a cheaper price in 
their own countries (via compulsory licenses and/or voluntary licenses). In other 
cases, patent protection makes it difficult for countries to purchase these drugs 
where they are sold at a cheaper price (that is, through parallel importation).
49 
This section focuses on the stand taken by the pharmaceutical industry in 
respect of the issue of patents and the lack of access to HIV/ AIDS drugs. In 
particular, the legal action taken by the pharmaceutical industry against the South 
African Governrnent is studied below. The section further analyses the arguments 
advanced by the pharmaceutical industry in support of its stand. Lastly, the 
section considers whether the actions of the pharmaceutical industry in blocking 
access to HIV/ AIDS drugs constitutes a breach of international human rights, in 
particular the right to health. 
48 Gostin, above, 24. 
49 Jeru1ifer Joni "The Global AIDS Crisis: Access to Treatment for HIV/AIDS : A Human Rights 
Issue in the Developing World" (2002) 17 Conn J lnt ' l L 273,275. 
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A. Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry's 
Stance: the South African Case Study5° 
The issues at stake in the debate over developing countries' efforts to 
make HIV/AIDS drugs more accessible are well-illustrated by South Africa's 
attempts to widen access to HIV/AIDS drugs and by the lawsuit that the 
pharmaceutical industry brought against the government to challenge that law. 
The post-apartheid Constitution guarantees South Africans the right to health care. 
To meet its constitutional duty, South Africa adopted a national policy of 
promoting access to essential drugs. In 1997, to further that policy, the South 
African Parliament passed the Medicines Act Amendment, granting the Minister 
of Health broad power to ensure access to affordable drugs.
51 
Among other provisions to make HIV/ AIDS drugs more affordable, the 
new law authorised the Minister of Health to adopt regulations requiring 
phamrncists to prescribe generic versions of drugs. The amendment further 
authorised the Minister to form a pricing committee, which is empowered to 
recommend a transparent pricing system for medicines. This provision would 
force phannaceutical companies to justify the prices they charge and prevent 
pharmacists from over pricing drugs. 52 
The most controversial provision of the amendment is section 10, which 
"d 53 prov1 es: 
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, 
and in particular may: 
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 
1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), determine that the rights with regard to any 
50 The facts and clu·onology of events of this case study is available at <h!IIL' www.tac.org.zaL> 
(last accessed 20 February 2004). 
51 See generally Lissett Feneira "Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights 
Obligations Of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations" (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev I 133, 
1148. 
52 Fe1Teira, above, 1149. 
53 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, o. 90 of 1997, available at 
<http:. ,w,, w. gov.za 'actsi97 inck x. html> (last accessed 17 February 2004). 
medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in 
respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market by the owner of 
the medicine, or with his or her consent; 
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in 
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same 
proprietary name as that of another medicine already registered in the 
Republic, but which is imported by a person other than the person who is the 
holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already registered and 
which originates from any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer as 
approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be imported; 
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the medicine 
referred to in paragraph (b ). 
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There has been considerable debate over the scope of the Health 
Minister's powers and the precise meaning of the provisions of section 10. On the 
one hand, the South African Government intended the law only to provide for 
parallel importing and generic substitution. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical 
industry interpreted the amendment to give the government much broader power. 
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), the law appears to allow the Minister of Health to revoke 
pham1aceutical patents in violation of South African law and the TRIPS 
Agreement. The phan11aceutical industry considered the amendment a violation of 
both the South African Constitution and the TRIPS Agreement, and thus brought 
a suit against the South African govemment.
54 
The next few sections analyse the arguments advanced by both the 
phan11aceutical industry and the South African Government in the said legal 
action. 
1. Constitution arguments 
The pharmaceutical industry attacked the new South African amendment 
as unconstitutional because it interpreted Section 10 to give the Minister of Health 
overly broad powers of implementation, thereby effectively allowing the 
54 Ferreira, above, l l 50. 
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government to deprive the pharmaceutical companies of their constitutional right 
to property. The phannaceutical industry also specifically attacked the 
constitutionality of, among other provisions, the law's sections providing for 
generic drug substitution and a drug pricing committee, in that the industry was 
unfairly being discriminated against in favour of the generic manufacturers. In 
reply to those allegations, the South African government argued that it had an 
express constitutional duty to provide health care to its citizens, and that the 
Medicines Act Amendment is critical to meeting that duty.
55 
2. TRIPS and intellectual property arguments 
The phannaceutical industry also claimed that the South African law 
violated the TRIPS Agreement on several grounds. In their complaint, the 
pharmaceutical companies asserted that the new South African law was 
inconsistent with Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, because it discriminated 
against pharmaceutical patents by providing lesser protections for pharmaceuticals 
than for other inventions. 56 Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that 
" ... patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in 
all fields of technology, ... " Therefore, the industry was of the opinion that their 
phamiaceutical patents should not be treated differently from any other patents. 
To counter this argument, it is important to note that Article 27 of the 
TRIPS Agreement must be interpreted in light of the objectives and principles of 
the TRIPS Agreement, as laid out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
respectively. The objectives outlined in Article 7 call for the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights to contribute to the "promotion of 
technological innovation ... to the mutual advantage of producers and users .. . 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of 
rights and obligations".57 The Medicines Amendment Act may be viewed as a 
mechanism employed by the South African Government to ensure intellectual 
property rights are protected and enforced in a manner conducive to social (in 
55 Ferreira, above, 1150 & 1151. 
56 Ferreira, above , 1151. 
57 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Oflntellectual Property Rights, Article 7. 
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view of the HIV/ AIDS epidemic conditions m South Africa) and economic 
welfare. 58 
Furthermore, Article 8 provides that member States "may, in formulating 
or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition ... provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement".59 The new South African law also represents a 
measure necessary to protect public health, in light of South Africa's public health 
crisis. Article 8 also highlights the potential need for appropriate measures, 
consistent with TRIPS, "to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by 
right holders". According to one commentator,60 it is not impossible, given the 
present epidemic conditions in South Africa, that pharmaceutical company patent 
rights holders may be abusing their intellectual property rights in South Africa. 
The limited supply of drugs produced or imported into South Africa, and the 
exorbitant South African prices on HIV/AIDS drugs demonstrate abuse of 
intellectual property rights under present conditions.
61 
The pharmaceutical industry further argued that, as written, the new law 
delegated broad powers to the Minister of Health that would enable the 
government to import generic versions of patented drugs, as well as to issue 
compulsory licenses for the local manufacture of generics under conditions 
beyond those that the TRIPS Agreement specifies.62 Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement allows member countries to participate in compulsory licensing. 
However, this licensing will be permitted only if the proposed user makes 
reasonable efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder of the patent. 
63 The 
proposed user must satisfy several other conditions, including making a showing 
that the authorisation will only be used to supply the country's domestic market.
64 
58 See Kara M Bombach "Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling The South African 
Medicines And Related Substances Act With The TRJPS Agreement" (2001) 19 B U Int ' I L J 273, 
293. 
59 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Off ntellectual Property Rights, Article 8. 
6° Kara M Bombach "Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling The South African Medicines 
And Related Substances Act With The TRJPS Agreement" (2001) 19 B U Int'I L J 273, 294. 
6 1 Kara M Bombach "Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling The South African Medicines 
And Related Substances Act With The TRJPS Agreement" (2001) 19 B U Int ' I L J 273,294. 
62 Ferreira, above, 1151. 
63 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Oflntellectual Property Rights, Article 31 (b ). 
64 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 31 (f). 
21 
Prior to the passage of the Medicines Act Amendment, South Africa 
already had limited power to issue compulsory licenses under the South African 
Patents Act of 1978. Section 4 of the Patents Act of 1978 provides that: 
[A] Minister of State may use an invention for public purposes on such 
conditions as may be agreed upon with the patentee, or in default of 
agreement on such conditions as are determined by the commissioner on 
application by or on behalf of such Minister and after hearing the 
patentee. 
Thus, the South African government argued that its existing Patents Act of 1978 
already provided for compulsory licensing, that the amendment introducing the 
new law was not designed to permit compulsory licensing, and that the 
government only intended to use the new Jaw for parallel importing. 
65 
In any event, even if the South African Government did intend the new 
law to cover compulsory licensing, it is submitted that the new law, contrary to 
the pharmaceutical industry's argument, would not be inconsistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement. This is because Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS Agreement allows 
the requirement for gaining the right holder's authorisation to be waived in "the 
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency". Even 
though South Africa had not officially declared the AIDS crisis a national 
emergency at that time, the HIV/ AIDS pandemic may constitute a national 
emergency for the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not seem to require a legal declaration of a "state of national 
emergency". However, if it did, then this case could at least qualify for the 
broader "circumstance of extreme urgency" language of Article 31. The rapid rate 
of HIV infection and AIDS death in South Africa is recognised as a case of 
extreme urgency.66 
Outside the courtroom, the industry also levelled broader challenges to the 
Jaw's validity under the TRIPS Agreement, claiming, for example, that the 
amendment violated Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement by allowing parallel 
65 Ferreira, above, 1152. 
66 Bombach, above, 289 & 290. 
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importing. 67 This argument may, however, be countered by the fact that Article 6 
of the TRIPS Agreement allows member States to engage in parallel importing by 
specifically abstaining from the issue of exhaustion, thus allowing member States 
to adopt whatever national policy they deem appropriate on the issue of 
exhaustion. Therefore, by permitting member States to adopt the principle of 
international exhaustion of patent rights, member States' Governments could 
allow parallel imports.68 Hence, it may be argued that there is no violation of 
Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
South Africa appears to have kept its promise that the new Jaw was 
intended only for parallel importing and not to permit compulsory licensing, since 
in the proposed regulations that the government later issued pursuant to the 
amended law, the government only provided for parallel importing.
69 
The debate over the law's validity under the TRIPS Agreement spilled out 
of the courtroom and into the global commw1ity, and was taken up by scholars, 
activists, government officials, and multilateral organisations. The United States 
(US) government initially adopted the industry's stance, opposing the law because 
it was "potentially" in violation of the TRIPS Agreement (see arguments 
advanced by the phaimaceutical industry as discussed above), was overly broad, 
and gave the Minister of Health excessive power. Consistent with its TRIPS-plus 
policy, the US repeatedly sought assurances from South Africa that the Medicines 
Act Amendment would not be implemented to allow parallel imports or 
compulsory licensing of phamrnceuticals. According to a group of organisations 
that met with representatives of the US government, however, the United States 
failed to articulate the precise provisions of the TRIPS Agreement it believed that 
South Africa's law violated.70 
Eventually, the pharmaceutical compames dropped their claim that the 
Medicines Act Amendment violated the TRIPS Agreement and limited their legal 
67 Ferreira , above, 115 I. 
68 Bombach, above, 289. 
69 Ferreira , above, 1152. 
7° Ferreira , above, 1152 & 1153. 
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action to challenging the law on constitutional grounds.
71 In April 2001, however, 
after widespread negative publicity, the pharmaceutical companies withdrew their 
lawsuit all together and reached an out-of-court settlement with the South African 
Government. The pharmaceutical companies agreed to cooperate with South 
Africa to provide HIV/ AIDS drugs at lower costs, and the South African 
Government agreed both to honour the TRIPS Agreement and to consult with the 
pharmaceutical industry on the proposed amendment. While PhRMA claims that 
the legal challenge was dropped because the South African Minister of Health 
promised to redraft the law, many commentators attribute the resolution of the 
legal challenge to the negative publicity that surrounded the lawsuit.
72 
Although the South African lawsuit was resolved and some programmes 
have been implemented since to provide wider access to HIV/ AIDS drugs in 
developing countries, HIV/ AIDS drugs still remain inaccessible and unaffordable 
to the majority of HIV-infected people in developing countries. The drug 
donations and discounts offered by pharmaceutical companies are not permanent 
solutions to the lack of access to affordable HIV/ AIDS drugs. 
73 
Furthermore, the pharmaceutical corporations and the American 
government continue to exert their substantial influence to prevent developing 
countries from implementing laws like South Africa's Medicines Act 
Amendment. For example, the pharmaceutical industry recently opposed the 
enactment of Kenyan legislation that would allow compulsory licensing and 
parallel importing to make HIV/AIDS drugs cheaper. Despite enacting laws 
pern1itting compulsory licensing, developing countries are reluctant to follow 
through and issue compulsory licenses for HIV/ AIDS drugs because of pressure 
from the pharmaceutical industry and the American government it lobbies. Thus, 
developing nations continue to struggle with the problem of ensuring affordable 
HIV/ AIDS drugs to their populations, while the pharn1aceutical industry and the 
United States continue to challenge these efforts by such developing countries, 
7 1 Feneira, above, 1153. 
72 Ferreira, above, 1156 & 1157. 
73 Feneira, above, 1157. 
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arguing that the efforts undermine intellectual property rights and international 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 
74 
B. Other Arguments Advanced by the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Besides the arguments raised by the pharmaceutical industry in the case 
against the South African Government (as pointed out above), there are other 
arguments proffered by the pharmaceutical industry in further support of their 
stand. These arguments are considered in general below. 
I. Patents not a barrier 
The phannaceutical industry denies that patents are responsible for the 
lack of access to HIV/ AIDS drugs in developing countries. The pharn1aceutical 
industry, instead, blames other barriers for the lack of access to HIV/ AIDS 
medications. !Other barriers the pharmaceutical industry points to are poverty, 
poor health infrastructure, the lack of government commitment to combating 
HIV/AIDS and other cultural barriers in the developing part of the world.
7 Whilst 
both advocates and opponents of HIV/ AIDS treatment access agree that high 
prices or protectionist laws are not the only barriers to providing high quality 
HIV/ AIDS care in the developing part of the world, they do, nevertheless, 
recognise that it is an important barrier. 
According to one article,76 the problems of fair and efficient methods of 
dissemination of HIV/ AIDS drugs in developing countries may, compared to the 
price barrier, be an even more difficult problem or bigger barrier to overcome. 
Allocation and distribution of drugs within crowded cities, among homeless 
people, and m remote vi II ages requ!fes organised transportation and 
communication systems. In some developing countries, the health care system 
74 Ferreira, above, l l 57 & 1158. 
75 Ferreira, above, 1139. 
76 Lawrence O Gostin "The Global Reach of HIV/AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics, And 
Research" 17 Emory lnt ' l L Rev I, 38. 
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may not be capable of accurately diagnosing HIV, monitoring viral load and 
checking for adverse reactions. Patients must also be educated correctly about the 
strict regimen of taking medications, especially the AR V drugs. 
Further, notwithstanding the fact that even if distribution is achieved in 
developing countries, ARY drugs may not be prescribed or taken appropriately. 
Incorrect or intermittent use of ARY medications could create serious health risks 
for individual patients and pose a wider risk to the population. One of the 
principal concerns of pharmaceutical companies is that the HIV virus could 
become resistant to existing medicines, rendering them less effective. The 
problems of resistance to ARY medications already exist and they would be 
exacerbated by large scale distribution to patients in developing countries who do 
not have the health care and support systems needed to ensure appropriate use .
77 
2. Inflated prices justified 
According to the pharmaceutical industry, the drug development process is 
lengthy, costly, and risky. Patent rights, which allow the inventors of new drugs to 
charge high prices, are necessary to provide incentives for the research and 
development of new drugs to treat diseases such as HIV/AIDS . Without patent 
protection, phannaceutical companies will no longer allocate their resources to 
finding new HIV/ AIDS drugs. 
78 
H d. 
79 h h . I owever, accor mg to one commentator, smce t e p armaceut1ca 
industry traditionally has failed to disclose its research and development 
investments, many accuse the pham1aceutical industry of inflating the research 
and development costs that fom1 the basis for the industry' s justification to 
artificially high pnces. The industry's critics assert that the phannaceutical 
industry spends twice as much on marketing rather than on research and 
development efforts. Some critics also assert that the industry' s very high 
profitability itself belies any claims about the risks involved in the development of 
77 See generally Gostin, above, 39. 
78 See generally Ferreira , above , l 142. 
79 Feneira, above , 1142. 
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new drugs. Additionally, they point out that the development of new drugs is 
frequently subsidised heavily by the taxpayer's money and performed in publicly-
funded laboratories. Thus, critics not only question the research and development 
claims that the industry uses to justify its inflated prices, but some also argue that 
it is unfair for pharmaceutical companies to reap huge profits from the inflated 
prices they charge for products developed using taxpayer's money.
80 
C. Pharmaceutical Industry's Actions in Blocking Access to HIV/AIDS 
Drugs: A Violation of the International Human Right to Health? 
By their actions in blocking access to HIV/ AIDS drugs, do these patent 
holders (that is, the pharmaceutical corporations) violate the international human 
right to health? According to one commentator,
81 two international legal 
instruments help formulate strong legal arguments for corporate human rights 
liability. The first is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration), which states in its Preamble that "every organ of society ... shall 
strive ... to promote respect for these rights and freedom and ... to secure their 
universal and effective recognition." A pharmaceutical corporation may be argued 
to be an "organ of society". This argument may be supported by the notion that if 
the drafters of the Universal Declaration intended to limit the scope of who should 
promote and recognise human rights to just public bodies and/or member States, 
the phrase "every State" instead of "every organ of society" would have been used 
by the said drafters. 
The second international instrument, which affinns the Universal 
Declaration, is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Human Rights Defenders 
Declaration).82 According to the Human Rights Defenders Declaration, 
so Ferreira, above, 1142. 
81 Barbara Coclu·ane Alexander "Lack of Access to HIV/ AIDS Drugs in Developing Countries: Is 
There a Violation of the International Human Right to Health? (2001) 8 Hum Rts Br 12, 14. 
82 See Barbara Cochrane Alexander "Lack of Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Developing 
Countries: Is There a Violation of the International Human Right to Health? (2001) 8 Hum Rts Br 
12, 14. 
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"individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organisations have an 
important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and 
advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes."
83 
However, the commentator concludes that although the two international 
legal instruments outlined above lend some legal precedent in setting forth the 
possibility of corporate responsibility for human rights violation, pharmaceutical 
corporations are unlikely to agree that they have any legal responsibility in respect 
of an international human right to health. 
84 
Sources of corporate responsibility for human rights can also be found in 
other international instruments/documents such as, the International Labour 
Organisation's Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (the ILO Declaration)8
5 and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development's guidelines (OECD Guidelines) for 
multinational companies.86 Presumably, the obligations in the ILO Declaration 
and OECD Guidelines would be applicable to major pharn1aceutical corporations 
( operating as multinational companies), that own patents to HIV/ AIDS drugs 
around the world. 
The ILO Declaration recommends that governments and multinational 
corporations operating in member States observe a set of principles. It calls on 
trans-national corporations to "take fully into account established general policy 
objectives of the countries in which they operate".
87 Moreover, the ILO 
Declaration also asserts that multinational corporations should "respect the 
sovereign rights of States, obey the national laws and regulations, give due 
83 United Nations Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs 
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Article 18, Paragraph 2. 
8
~ Alexander, above, 14. 
85 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises a11d Social Policy, 
available at <htt :.'.l www.ilo.oro/Jublic!cm.dish/standards/nonnsourccs ·nmc.htm> (last accessed 
20 February 2004). 
86 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Revision 2000), available at 
<ht[Q :i/www.occ<l.on.uc..lataoccQL~6 1361l922428. c..11> (last accessed 20 February 2004). 
87 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
above, paragraph 10. 
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consideration to local practices and respect relevant international standards. "
88 
The ILO Declaration specifically calls on trans-national corporations to respect 
the International Bill ofRights.89 
The OECD Guidelines (Revision 2000) obligate corporations to "Respect 
the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host 
government's international obligations and commitments."
90 The OECD 
Guidelines also specify that multinational corporations should "take fully into 
account established policies in the countries in which they operate" and, 
specifically, ensure that their activities are consistent with their host country's 
technology policies.91 
Additionally, the OECD Guidelines exhort corporations to contribute to 
economic and social progress, and specify the affirmative obligations of 
multinational corporations in the area of science and technology. Thus, they 
suggest that when practicable or appropriate, multinational corporations should 
"contribute to the development of local and national innovative capacity"
92 and 
"Adopt ... practices that permit the transfer and rapid diffusion of technologies 
and know-how, with due regard to the protection of intellectual property rights."
93 
The commentary to the OECD Guidelines further specifies that "When selling or 
licensing technologies ... the terms and conditions negotiated [should) be 
reasonable. "94 
The international standards outlined above also impose simultaneous 
obligations on corporations to respect the human rights obligations of countries 
and to themselves respect and support international human rights. Reading these 
multiple obligations together, therefore, suggests that corporations have a duty to 
88 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
above, paragraph 8. 
89 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
above, paragraph 8. 
90 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Revision 2000), Part I, II, paragraph 2. 
9 1 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Revision 2000), Part I , Vlll, paragraph I . 
92 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Revision 2000), Part I, VIII, paragraph I. 
93 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Revision 2000), Part I, VIII, paragraph 2. 
94 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Revision 2000), Part 3 (Commentaries), 
paragraph 54. 
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respect those national laws and policies which are consistent with international 
human rights standards. In the case of South Africa, for example, the Medicines 
Act Amendment (and similar legislations elsewhere in the world) is an effort by 
the South African Government to actively promote important human rights, and 
thus should be respected by the pharmaceutical corporations.
95 
Furthermore, in view of the staggering magnitude of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in developing nations, State policies and laws that seek to make life-
saving drugs available to those dying of HIV/ AIDS reflect particularly legitimate 
and weighty goals worthy of the respect and cooperation of the pharmaceutical 
corporations. Additionally, since the right to affordable HIV/ AIDS treatment is a 
human right that States are obligated to protect, laws to promote access to life-
prolonging medications accord with international human rights law. The South 
African Medicines Act Amendment (and similar laws), for example, directly 
promote human rights by more equitably distributing life-prolonging medications 
among HIV positive people. 96 
According to one commentator,97 some may argue that pharmaceutical 
companies do not have any obligation to respect laws to increase access to 
HIV/AIDS drugs because such laws violate developing countries' international 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. While the pharmaceutical industry and 
its supporters continue to oppose laws such as South Africa's Medicines Act 
Amendment, the consensus is that the Medicines Act Amendment is valid under 
the TRIPS Agreement - see arguments in Part III(A)(2) above. Additionally, in 
the recent Doha Declaration,98 the World Trade Organisation (WTO) interpreted 
the TRIPS Agreement to allow developing countries to make HIV/AIDS drugs 
more affordable, including through the use of compulsory licensing and parallel 
importing. As a WTO ministerial pronouncement, the Doha Declaration is a 
"persuasive authority" that asserts that the TRIPS Agreement does indeed allow 
such practices, which laws like the Medicines Act Amendment seek to introduce 
95 See generally Lissett Ferreira "Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights 
Obligations Of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations" (2002) 71 Fordham L Rev 1133, 
1174. 
96 See generally Ferreira , above, 1174. 
97 See Ferreira, above, 1175. 
98 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: TRIPS, WT/MIN(Ol)/DEC/2 (20 November 2001). 
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in order to make HIV/AIDS drugs more broadly accessible.
99 
Furthermore, the pharmaceutical industry's interpretation of those laws is 
based on a TRIPS-plus approach (that is, interpretation on issues such as 
compulsory licensing and parallel importing - see arguments in Part III(A)(2) 
above), which seeks to force developing countries to offer their products greater 
patent protection than the minimum standards the TRIPS Agreement requires. The 
WTO member States, however, signed on to the standards in the TRIPS 
Agreement, not the TRIPS-plus obligations that the phamrnceutical industry seeks 
to impose. Pharmaceutical companies are not obligated to respect laws that violate 
the TRIPS Agreement, but the pharmaceutical industry has failed to prove that 
laws like the South African Medicines Act Amendment violate the TRIPS 
Agreement. As such, there is little merit to the argument that pharmaceutical 
companies do not have an obligation to respect laws like South Africa's 
Medicines Act Amendment because they violate the TRIPS Agreement.
100 
Additionally, there is some suggestion m the international codes of 
conduct that corporations have an affirmative obligation to cooperate with their 
host states. The ILO Declaration specifically recommends that corporations 
affirmatively ham1onise their activities with their host States' social and 
development policies. The pham1aceutical companies' multi-faceted attack on 
laws such as the South African Medicines Act Amendment is inconsistent with 
this obligation to cooperate with, and conform their activities to, State efforts to 
make HIV/AIDS drugs affordable and thus more accessible.
101 
Moreover, the pham1aceutical companies may also violate their obligation 
to respect and cooperate with State policies to promote the right to medical 
treatment when they charge prices so high that only one-tenth of one percent of 
worldwide HIV/AIDS sufferers can buy their drugs.
102 The consistently high 
prices pharmaceutical companies charge directly conflict with the shared goal of 
many developing states to ensure treatment to those dying of HIV/ AIDS. As such, 
99 See generally Ferreira , above, 1175. 
100 See generally Ferreira, above, 1175. 
101 See generally Fe1Teira, above, 1175 & 1176. 
102 See generally Ferreira, above, I l 76. 
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the pnces pharmaceutical corporations charge for their patented drugs in the 
developing world may not only be unreasonable and unethical, but also a violation 
of their obligations under the international codes of conduct not to interfere with 
the legitimate policies of host govemrnents. 103 
IV. Balancing the Right to Health and the Right to Property 
The tension between developed and developing world perspectives 1s 
reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration). 
On the one hand, the Universal Declaration guarantees the right to property and 
the protection of material interests resulting from scientific discovery.
104 On the 
other hand, it guarantees the right to health, education, and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits, as discussed above. Developed countries seek the 
right to protection of their proprietary interests resulting from scientific discovery, 
whilst least developed countries seek the right to share in scientific discoveries 
and to the health of the population.
105 
It is important to note that the WTO rules do provide limited methods of 
circumventing intellectual property rules where necessary to protect the public's 
health. Firstly, as pointed out earlier, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement provides 
a general public interest exception to the protection of intellectual property that 
allows member States to adopt necessary measures to protect public health and to 
promote public interest. Secondly, whilst Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement 
confers exclusive rights on the inventor to manufacture, use, sell or import its 
invention, Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement allows member States some room 
to limit such exclusive rights and to take into account " the legitimate interests of 
third parties". Thirdly, with regards to parallel imports, although the TRIPS 
Agreement does not directly address it, Article 6 leaves the issue of exhaustion to 
the discretion of the WTO members, thus, in effect, sanctioning parallel 
importing. Lastly, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for domestic 
103 See generally Ferreira, above, 11 76. 
104 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Artic les 17 & 27(2). 
105 Lawrence O Gostin "The Global Reach of HIV/AIDS: Science, Politics , Economics, And 
Research" 17 Emory Int ' l L Rev 1, 33. 
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legislation permitting compulsory licensing, subject to certain conditions. 
"National emergency" or "circumstances of extreme urgency" are maJor 
exceptions to fulfilling the conditions where compulsory licensing is allowed.
106 
As argued earlier as well, although the use of compulsory licenses is 
enshrined in TRIPS, phannaceutical companies, supported by developed nations 
(in particular by the United States of America), have strongly resisted claims of a 
national health emergency, preferring instead to maintain their patents. For 
example, Thailand, under intense pressure from the United States (pressure of 
being imposed with trade sanctions), amended its law to provide patent protection 
for drugs and to limit compulsory licensing and the importation of patented drugs. 
This occurred against a backdrop of an epidemic in which one million people are 
infected with HIV and where AIDS is the leading cause of death.
107 
According to one article, 108 the US Census Bureau estimates that the 
HIV/ AIDS epidemic has reduced life expectancy in South Africa by fifteen years 
and in Zimbabwe by thirty-two years and compares these justifications for 
compulsory licenses with those made by political leaders in the United States in 
response to the intentional release of anthrax in 2001 even though there were only 
a half dozen deaths from anthrax. Politicians suggested that the United States 
exercised its compulsory licensing privilege under the TRIPS Agreement to 
permit cheap production of the antibiotic Cipro, without the consent of Bayer 
Phannaceuticals. 109 
There are creative ways to relax rigid trade rules to allow less developed 
countries to obtain essential medicines at a more affordable cost.
11 0 Through the 
innovative thinking of political leaders in developed and Jess developed countries, 
the criteria for the issuance of compulsory licenses under Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement could be clarified. The international trade system should recognise the 
106 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Oflntellectual Property Rights, Article 3 1 (b ). 
107 Goslin, above, 34. 
108 Gostin, above, 34. 
109 Gostin, above, 34 & 35. 
11 0 Gostin, above, 35 . 
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devastating public health effects of HIV/ AIDS in resource poor countries. 111 
A joint study conducted in 2002, by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and the World Health Organisation (WHO) on the relationship between trade 
rules and public health, revealed that the WTO Agreements are sensitive to health 
issues. In fact, the study affirms that health concerns take precedence over trade 
issues and that if necessary, governments may put aside WTO commitments in 
order to protect human life. Furthermore, the then Deputy Director General of the 
WTO affirmed that according to the WTO jurisprudence, human health has been 
recognised as being "important in the highest degree". 112 
The Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, as further 
discussed below, clarified that patent protection does not and should not prevent 
member nations from taking measures to protect public health.
113 In other words, 
when weighing public health against property rights, public health should always 
be heavier. 
All of the above indicate that the right to health can be interpreted 
consistently, and thus balanced, with intellectual property rights. Intellectual 
property rights are important to the research and development of HIV/ AIDS drugs 
and deserve protection. However, intellectual property rights do not, and should 
not trump human rights. Through its various public interest exceptions to patent 
protections, the TRIPS Agreement makes it clear that, under certain 
circumstances, it is legal and appropriate to limit intellectual property rights to 
achieve broader societal goals. This is further fortified by the recent WTO Doha 
Declaration (discussed further below) clarifying the ability of WTO member 
nations to use the flexibilities that are built into the TRIPS Agreement to protect 
public health. Given the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in developing 
countries and the widespread lack of access to HIV/ AIDS drugs in those 
countries, laws increasing access to HIV/ AIDS drugs like the South African 
111 Gostin, above, 35. 
112 WTO ews: 2002 Press Releases, Press/310 (20 August 2002). 
11 3 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: TRJPS, WT/MIN(Ol )/DEC/2 (20 November 200 I) . 
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Medicines Amendment Act, are an appropriate limitation on intellectual property 
rights. 
V. ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND EFFECT OF 
TRIPS IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AND PATENT 
MATTERS 
This section of the paper provides an introduction to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), its agreements and its dispute settlement system. This 
section also analyses the steps taken by the WTO to address the problems posed 
by the TRIPS Agreement to developing country members of the WTO, in 
particular, the negative influence the TRIPS Agreement has exerted on developing 
country members' domestic public health policies (as discussed above). The 
relationship between the WTO and human rights is also examined in this section. 
A. An Overview of WTO and Its Dispute Settlement Process 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was formed as a result of the need 
to ensure that world trade flowed as smoothly, predictably and freely as 
possible. 114 Although the WTO began life on 1 January 1995, its trading system is 
half a century older. Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GA TT) had provided the rnles for the system. In fact, the second WTO 
ministerial meeting, held in Geneva in May 1998, included a celebration of the 
50th anniversary of the system. It did not take long for the General Agreement to 
give birth to an unofficial, de facto international organisation, also known 
informally as GATT. Over the years, GATT evolved through several rounds of 
negotiations. The last and largest GATT round, was the Uruguay Round which 
lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the creation of the WTO. Whereas GATT had 
11 ~ See explanation of the WTO, its role and its functions, at the WTO website, available at 
<~ \\\\'W.\\to.org/cndi shithcwto c!what is c/td' c fact ! c.htrn> (lastaccessed 14February 
2004). 
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mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements now cover trade in 
services, and in traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property).
11 5 
There are a number of ways oflooking at the WTO. Firstly, the WTO is an 
organization for liberalising trade. Where countries have faced trade barriers and 
wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to liberalise trade. However, 
the WTO is not just about liberalising trade. In some circumstances, its rules 
support maintaining trade barriers, for example, to protect consumers or to 
prevent the spread of diseases. 11 6 
Secondly, it is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements . In 
fact, the WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is as a 
result of negotiations. The bulk of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986-
1994 negotiations, called the Uruguay Round, and earlier negotiations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as discussed above. The WTO 
is currently the host to new negotiations, under the "Doha Development Agenda" 
launched in 2001 . At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by 
the bulk of the world's trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground 
rules for international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding member 
governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated 
and signed by member governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and 
services, exporters, and importers conduct their business, while allowing 
governments to meet social and environmental objectives.
11 7 
Thirdly, the WTO is a place for governments to settle trade disputes, via 
the operation of a system of trade rules. Essentially, the WTO is a place where 
member governments go, to try to sort out the trade problems they face with each 
other. The first step, of course, is to talk. Trade relations often involve conflicting 
interests. Furthermore, agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in 
11 5 See explanation of the WTO, its role and its functions, at the WTO websitt-, available at 
<.!J..t1R :!/www. wtq. 1i~no lish; thewto e/what i~_ej ti (' cifact l e.htm> (last accessed 14 February 
2004) . 
11 6 See explanation of the WTO, its role and its functions, on the WTO website, available at 
<http: ! ww,, . "' to .nro;cngli sh·thew~'hati s e, tif c, fact I c.htm> (las t accessed 14 February 
2004) . 
11 7 See the WTO website, as above. 
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the WTO system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle 
these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an agreed legal 
foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement process written into 
the WTO agreements. 118 
The system's overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible, 
so long as there are no undesirable side effects. That partly means removing 
obstacles and ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what 
the trade rules are around the world; and giving them the confidence that there 
will be no sudden changes of policy. In other words, the rules have to be 
"transparent" and predictable. 119 
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (the Understanding on Dispute Settlement or DSU) 
established "an integrated, rules-based dispute settlement process with a right of 
appellate review." 120 Only member States can initiate complaints and intervene in 
proceedings and the DSU is the only mechanism available for resolving disputes, 
unless parties agree otherwise. The DSU assures "that all panel or Appellate Body 
reports will be adopted expeditiously and without modification."
121 
The DSU also prohibits members from acting unilaterally on the following 
issues: "(1) whether an Uruguay Round agreement has been violated, (2) whether 
another member has failed to implement a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
recommendation within a reasonable period of time, or (3) whether the level of 
suspension of concessions is appropriate." 122 The purpose of this commitment is 
. d b . d . d d 123 to ensure that govemment-sanct1one arners o not 11npe e tra e. 
11 8 See the WTO website, as above. 
11 9 See the WTO website, as above. 
120 See the WTO website page on dispute settlement, available at 
<h.lli2: //www.wto.nrg.it:nglish, trato e; dispu e:disu.u e.htm> (last accessed 2LI February 2004). 
12 1 See generally Johanna Kiehl "TRIPS Article 31 (B) And The HIV/ AIDS Epidemic" (2002) 10 J 
lntell Prop L 143, 154. 
122 See generally Johanna Kiehl "TRIPS Article 31 (B) And The HIV/AIDS Epidemic" (2002) 10 J 
lntell Prop L 143, 154. 
123 See generally Johanna Kiehl "TRIPS Article 3 l(B) And The HIV/AIDS Epidemic" (2002) 10 J 
IntellPropL 143,154. 
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After a country petitions the WTO to settle a dispute, the member States 
involved in the dispute undergo negotiations. If these discussions are not fruitful , 
the parties decide the composition of the panel of experts to consider the case. 
Panels only base findings on cited agreements, and they only address claims and 
issues necessary to reach a decision. They can accept amicus briefs, though they 
are not required to do so.124 One commentator suggests that when amicus briefs 
are attached to a party' s submission, the information appears to be "treated as part 
of the government's materials for purposes of accepting the information and 
having the opportunity to respond to it."125 The WTO 's General Council, acting as 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) under the DSU, then accepts or rejects a 
panel's conclusion. Rejection, however, must be by consensus, making panel 
decisions virtually impossible to overturn. After a ruling of the DSB, both sides 
can appeal. 126 
Three members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body hear the 
appeal. Members of the Appellate Body, like panels, can only base findings on 
cited agreements, but they can substitute a panel decision with a de novo decision 
of their own. After the Appellate Body gives a report, the DSB again decides 
whether to accept or reject it. Like panel reports, Appellate Body reports can only 
be rejected by a consensus of the DSB.
127 
In this system, the panel and Appellate Body reports are not judgments; 
they are legal advice given to the DSB, which makes the actual decision. The 
adoption of reports, however, is "quasi-automatic," due to DSB 's voting system. 
Therefore, the WTO dispute settlement " in practice .. . functions as a judicial 
system of settling international disputes ... The direction taken by the WTO 
system has set it firmly on route to becoming recognised de facto as an 
. . 1 ,,128 mternat,ona court ... 
124 See the WTO website page on dispute se ttlement, ava ilable at 
<htt :!/www.wto .org!cnnli sh, thcwto c/whati s c/tif c,dis I c.htm> (las t accessed 20 February 
2004). 
125 Kiehl , above, 155. 
126 See the WTO website page on dispute settlement, available at 
<http:/:\vww. wto.oro;cn \! li sh ' thewto c/whati s d ti f ciuis l c.htm> (las t accessed 20 February 
2004) . 
127 See the WTO website page on dispute settlement, as above. 
128 Kiehl , above, 155 & 156 . 
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According to one commentator, 129 many people characterize the WTO as a 
secretive and powerful organisation, which is isolated from non-governmental 
influence, and which limits state sovereignty. To some extent, these descriptions 
are accurate. Hearings are private; governments that petition the DSB do not have 
to make public their full submissions; and the WTO only recently began 
publishing certain materials. Its panels and Appellate Body are not required to 
consider amicus briefs presented by non-governmental organisations. And finally, 
the organisation has a highly effective, enforceable dispute settlement mechanism 
that prohibits States from acting unilaterally. 130 
Probably the most important characteristic of the WTO, however, is that 
its pnmary aim is to facilitate trade liberalisation. The DSU was primarily 
designed to promote that goal, not other social policies such as development, 
environment, security, and labour standards. Though many critics argue the WTO 
is an isolated organisation that acts against the important policy objectives of its 
member states, the fact that the WTO favours free trade objectives over other 
social policy objectives may be a reflection of the national interests of its member 
states.131 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become increasingly active 
in the area of human rights and international trade law, especially where the WTO 
is concerned. However, while other international forums have embraced the 
participation of NGOs in policy-making or legislative activities, the WTO has 
been far less hospitable to NGO involvement and does not permit NGOs 
attendance at WTO General Council or WTO committee meetings.
132 
The WTO has, however, showed some encouraging signs of change. For 
example, since 1998, the WTO has allowed NGOs to submit amicus curiae briefs 
for some cases entering the dispute settlement process, and has taken steps to 
129 Kiehl , above, 156. 
13° Kiehl , above, 156. 
131 Kiehl , above, 156. 
132 See generally Rona Nardone " Like Oil And Water: The WTO And The World 's Water 
Resources" 19 (2003) Conn J lnt ' l L 183, 194. 
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address its relationship with NGOs. 133 In fact, in November 2001, at the Doha 
Ministerial Conference, member governments agreed to negotiate to improve and 
clarify the DSU. 134 Amongst one of the proposals submitted was to open up the 
WTO's dispute settlement mechanism to public scrutiny, and to allow NGOs to 
offer unsolicited briefs as friends of the court (amicus curiae) to the dispute 
settlement panels and the Appellate Body. The United States, which championed 
the cause of NGOs, made a three-page proposal related to transparency, calling 
for complete public access to hearings, unrestricted access to amicus curiae briefs, 
timely access to submissions and timely access to final reports.
135 
However, the US proposal to open up the WTO's dispute settlement 
mechanism to public scrutiny and to allow NGOs to offer unsolicited briefs as 
amicus curiae to the dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body met with 
resistance from some WTO members, in particular, by two ASEAN trade 
d. l 136 A d. 131 h . . 1p omats. ccor mg to one commentator, sout em countries oppose am1cus 
submissions, arguing that such submissions erode the rights of governments 
without access to legal resources and tilt the dispute resolution system against 
them. The commentator further argues that, for developing countries, the issue is 
not one of resource reallocation because the necessary resources are either non-
existent or severely limited; these governments are burdened by personnel and 
financial constraints, which preclude effective participation in dispute panel 
hearings and other WTO events. 
138 
According to the Doha Declaration,139 by May 2003 , the WTO members 
were required to agree on a set of reforn1 proposals to improve the functioning of 
133 Rona Nardone "Like Oil And Water: The WTO And The World 's Water Resources" (2003) 19 
Conn J Int ' l L 183, 194. 
134 See the WTO 's website page on dispute settl ement, available at 
<htrp:1/,\ ww. wto .org/eng]ish/ tratop e/dispu e,dispu e.htm#negotiations> (last accessed 20 
February 2004). 
135 See article entitled "ASEAN Rejects US Call For GO Access To WTO Dispute Process", 
Global Policy Forum website, avail able at <http:, 'v\ w,\ .globalpolicv.on.! ngos role. globalactiint-
insti2002!0917a ean.htm> (last accessed 20 February 2004). 
136 See article on Global Policy Forum website, as above. 
137 Rona Nardone "Like Oil And Water: The WTO And The World 's Water Resources" (2003) 19 
Conn J Int ' I L 183, 194. 
138 Nardone, above, 194. 
139 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001 : Ministeri al Declara tion WT/MI (01 )/DE /1 (20 November 
2001 ), available at <http: /,\v\, w. wlo.org/cnglish ·thcwto e;minist e. minO 1 c. mmdccl c.htm> (las t 
accessed 13 December 2003). 
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its dispute settlement understanding. The am1cus cunae issue, which involves 
NGOs in environment or industry lobbies submitting briefs directly to panels or 
the Appellate Body, has divided the WTO. Therefore, on 24 July 2003 , 
acknowledging the fact that the DSB special session needed more time to 
conclude its work, the General Council agreed to extend the special session's 
timeframe by one year, to May 2004.140 
B. TRIPS and Its Affect ill General 
In 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS Agreement).
141 The 
TRIPS Agreement emerged from the Uruguay Round, one of the rounds of 
negotiations, forming part of the GA TT. 142 Over one hundred countries, including 
the United States and South Africa, signed the treaty. The purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement, and arguably its effect, is to set minimum requirements for the 
protection of intellectual property rights to which all member nations must adhere. 
The TRIPS Agreement covers copyrights, trademarks, geographic indications, 
industrial designs, and patents.143 
Compliance with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement provides 
member cotmtries with two advantages; that is, firstly, the benefit of national 
treatment 144 and secondly, most-favoured-nation treatment.
145 National treatment 
ensures that imported goods receive the same intellectual property protections as 
goods produced within the importing country. For example, because both the 
United States and South Africa signed the TRIPS Agreement, the United States is 
assured that South Africa will provide the same patent protections to HIV/ AIDS 
140 See the WTO 's website page on d ispute settlement, ava il able at 
<b..!.!J2:!.!www.v\"to.org/english/ tratop e!dispu e. dispu e.htm#negotiations> (las t accessed 20 
February 2004 ). 
141 Information obtained from WTO website, ava ilable at 
<J.illp: /-' www. wto.orgh.:nglish/docs e/ lcgal cilcgal c.htm> (last accessed 13 December 2003). 
142 See di scuss ion of TRIPS, <h! ://www.wto .org ·cnglishithcwto c\\lia..LiL el tif cj agrm7 e.htm> 
(last accessed 13 December 2003). 
143 See overview of TRIPS, <)}!!:p: i' W\\ w.wt-9.Q~cm.dish 1trato) c/trips_s/ intc12 c.htlJ}> (las t 
accessed 13 December 2003). 
144 Aoreement On T rade-Related Aspects Of Intellec tual Property Rights (TRIPS), Article 3. 
b 
145 TRIPS, Article 4 . 
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drugs imported from the United States as it does to HIV/AIDS drugs made in 
South Africa. Most favoured nation treatment means that all WTO member 
countries will receive the same custom rates or duties. No country can give 
reduced duties to one WTO member nation without giving the same reduced 
duties to all other WTO member countries. 146 
If a member country violates the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, then 
that nation risks losing its "general market access entitlements under the 
WT0." 147 The nation also opens itself up to trade sanctions from other member 
nations. The TRIPS Agreement allows developing countries five years to comply 
with the provisions of the treaty. It allows "least developed" countries a ten-year 
period before they must apply the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, 
developing countries such as South Africa had to be in compliance b 1 January 
2000. Other less developed countries, including nations in sub-Saharan Africa, 
have until 1 January 2005, to come into full compliance with the TRIPS 
agreement. 148 
C. TRIPS and Public Health 
It has been said that the TRIPS Agreement has exerted negative influence 
on the implementation of domestic public health policies in many developing 
country members of the WTO by adversely affecting their access to medicines. 
One commentator states: 
149 
Africa is suffering the anguish and plight of the HIV/ AIDS epidemic, loud 
protests rise high into the sky above Seattle squares, and heated debates 
occur among the attendees of many international conferences; these are all 
examples of the heavy pressure aimed at the TRIPS Agreement. Appeals 
that the WTO undertake to reform the Agreement with respect to public 
146 See generally Ange la G Thornton-Millard "Intellectual Property Rights and the AIDS Epidemic 
in Sub-Saharan Africa" (2001) 11 Transnat ' l L & Contemp Probs 517. 
147 Angela G Thornton-Millard "Intellectual Property Rights and the AIDS Epidemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa" (200 I) 11 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 517, 523. 
148 Angela G Thornton-Millard "Intellectual Property Rights and the AIDS Epidemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa" (200 I) 11 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 517, 523. 
149 Haochen Sun "A Wider Access To Patented Drugs Under The TRIPS Agreement" (2003) 21 B 
Ulnt'l LJ 101 , 102. 
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health issues have never been so loud and clear. 
This view is further exemplified by the legal action taken by the pharmaceutical 
industry against the South African Government, as discussed in Part III(A) above. 
1. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health 
Recognizing the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing countries, WTO members at the Doha Ministerial Conference 
attempted to integrate the TRIPS Agreement into part of the international action to 
address public health problems. 150 Although there were some conflicting views 
regarding the conditions under which the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement 
could be used, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
adopted on 14 November 2001 by consensus at the Doha Ministerial Conference 
(Doha Declaration) helped to prevent situations where developing country 
members could not avail themselves fully to the flexibility provided in the TRIPS 
Agreement due to pressure from interested groups. The Doha Declaration marked 
a turning point for political and legal relations at the WT0.
151 
The Doha Declaration states that whilst the protection of intellectual 
property is important for the development of new medicines, the TRIPS 
Agreement, however, does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health. 152 Accordingly, the TRIPS Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of a WTO 
member's right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for everyone. Applying the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international Jaw, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement should be read in the 
150 See Doha Declaration explained on the WTO website, ava ilable at 
<htl ://www.wto. m o/enolish/tratop citr ips cil1cal thdcckxpln c. htm> (last accessed 14 Febrnary 
2004). 
151 Haochen Sun "A Wider Access To Patented Drugs Under The TRIPS Agreement" (2003) 21 B 
U Int'l L J 101 ,104. 
152 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: TRIPS, WT/MIN(O I )/DEC/2 (20 November 200 I) [Doha 
Declaration] , available at 
<http:, !v. v. v. . \Vto.orgien\!li shithcwto cimin ist c 'minO 1 c;mimlecl trips e. htm> (last accessed 14 
February 2004). 
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light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles. 153 
The Doha Declaration clearly outlines all the key flexibilities available in 
the TRIPS Agreement, including: the right of member nations to use compulsory 
licensing and to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted; 154 
the right of member nations to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, which can ease the granting of 
compulsory licenses; 155 the right of member nations to determine their own 
parallel import regimes, "subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of 
Articles 3 and 4;" 156 and the right of least developed country members to postpone 
providing pharmaceutical patents until at least 1 January 2016, and possibly 
longer. I 57 l 
In addition, the Doha Declaration reaffirms the commitment of developed-
country members to provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to 
promote and encourage technology transfer to least developed country members 
pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
158 Moreover, since the granting 
of exclusive marketing rights will materially impair the additional extension 
accorded by the Doha Declaration to the least developed country members by 
delaying the application of providing patent protection to pharmaceutical products 
for ten years, paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration instructs the TRIPS Council to 
take the necessary action to give effect to this extension. 
159 
Considering that obligations of granting exclusive marketing rights, where 
applicable, should not prevent the attainment of the objectives of paragraph 7 of 
the Declaration, the General Council adopted a waiver decision on 8 July 2002. 
Pursuant to this decision, the obligations of least-developed country members 
under paragraph 9 of Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement are waived with respect 
153 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 5(a). 
154 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 5(b) . 
155 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 5(c). 
156 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 5(d). 
157 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 7. 
158 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 7. 
159 Haochen Sun "A Wider Access To Patented Drugs Under The TRIPS Agreement" (2003) 21 B 
Uint'lLJ 101 , 105. 
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to pharmaceutical products until 1 January 2016. The decision is part of the WTO 
members' ongoing efforts to ensure that intellectual property protection supports, 
and does not obstruct, a poorer nation's need to tackle serious public health 
problems. As pointed out by the former Director-General of WTO, Mike 
Moore: 160 
I am pleased that WTO members have acted promptly to implement this 
important part of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health, and 
have seen fit to go beyond the strict reading of that declaration by also 
approving a draft waiver on exclusive marketing rights. 
This waiver indicates that the reform in the TRIPS Agreement concerning 
public health will take the developing country members' essential needs into 
account, and the remaining unsolved issue of how to assist some developing 
members to make effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS 
Agreement will have more optimistic prospects. 161 
The Doha Declaration also recognises that there are WTO members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the phannaceutical sector and thus 
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPS Agreement In respect of that, the Doha Declaration instructed the TRIPS 
Council to find an expeditious way to facilitate effective use of compulsory 
licensing to address public health needs and to report to the General Council 
before the end of 2002. 162 This has been referred to as the "Paragraph 6" issue, as 
it comes under that paragraph in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public 
health . Although the original deadline of 31 December 2002 to solve the 
Paragraph 6 issue was missed, it has now been solved, and is discussed below. 
160 See WTO NEWS: 2002 PRESS RELEASES, Press/30 1 (28 June 2002), available at 
<h!!.p:/iwww. wto.oro/cnglish/ ncws c: rcsD} e, pr_1Ql __ fJHm> (las t accessed 23 February 2004). 
16 1 Haochen Sun "A Wider Access To Patented Drugs Under The TRJPS Agreement" (2003) 21 B 
U Int'l L J 101 ,106. 
162 Doha Declaration, above, paragraph 6. 
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2. Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and public health 
Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement states that products made under 
compulsory licensing must be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market". This applies directly to member countries that can manufacture drugs. It 
limits the amount that those countries can export when the drugs are made under 
compulsory licence. Article 31 (f) also has an indirect impact on member countries 
unable to make medicines and therefore intend to import generics. Such member 
countries would find it difficult to find other member countries willing to supply 
them with drugs made under compulsory licensing. 
On 30 August 2003, the TRIPS General Council agreed to allow WTO 
member countries to export pham1aceutical products made under compulsory 
licences within the terms set out in the decision. 163 All WTO member countries 
are eligible to import under this decision, but 23 developed countries are listed in 
the decision as announcing voluntarily that they will not use the system to import. 
The decision takes the form of an interim waiver, which allows countries 
producing generic copies of patented products under compulsory licenses to 
export the products to eligible importing countries. This waiver would last until 
the TRIPS Agreement is amended. 164 The General Council chairperson stressed 
that the decision "should be used in good faith to protect public health and ... not 
be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives."
165 
D. WTO and Human Rig/its 
163 See decision of WTO General Council, WT/L/540 ( 1 September 2003) - Implementation of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRlPS Agreement and public hea lth , available at 
<http:liwww. wto.or"/cnglish!tratop c'trips c.' im )icm ara6 c.htm> (last accessed 14 Febrnary 
2004). 
164 See WTO NEWS: 2003 Press Releases, Press/350/Rev 1 (30 August 2003), available at 
<htt :1·www.wto.oro/9ng]ish/ncws c: rcs03 c'pr_l.iO c.htm> (last accessed 20 February 2004). 
165See WTO NEWS: 2003 News Items (30 August 2003), available at 
<http:/1\\ \~ w. wto.org en!!. li sh/news c!nC\\ s03 c trips slat 28aug03 e.htrn> (last accessed 20 
February 2004). 
46 
It has been said that although international trade agreements, including the 
WTO Agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and others, explicitly recognise 
the need for trade efforts to promote human rights and general welfare, in practice, 
trade negotiations and applications have often been characterised by widespread 
disregard for human rights and the welfare of the poorest and most vulnerable 
group.
166 
A clear example of this can be seen from the South African case study 
discussed above. 
According to one scholar, 167 international finance, trade and human rights 
have developed their own systems of monitoring and adjudication. It is the failure 
to coordinate these systems, and to integrate the obligations that states have taken 
on in the field of human rights into agreements reached regarding trade, that 
would continue to perpetuate the unintended subordination of human rights. 
Advocates should pursue efforts to coordinate those systems and to include 
specific human rights representation and criteria in the standards of those other 
bodies. Advocacy that seeks to address areas traditionally considered outside the 
scope of human rights, such as trade, intellectual property, or the environment, 
must utilise both human rights provisions and innovative strategies. The 
Treatment Action Coalition (TAC) in South Africa employed a mixed approach 
that may serve as a useful possible example. TAC drew upon national law, 
incorporated human rights norms, and utilised a strong public health justification 
in its substantive claims. It mobilised national and international attention on the 
arguments put forward by the pharmaceutical companies, which ultimately 
resulted in their withdrawal of their suit challenging South Africa's 1997 law.
168 
The Doha Declaration and its subsequent decisions, as discussed above, 
clearly indicate that the WTO is able to balance humanitarian as well as trade 
concerns. The fact that WTO members have managed to find a compromise in 
such a complex issue (that is allowing the poorer member nations to make full use 
of the flexibilities in the WTO's intellectual property rules in order to deal with 
166 See generally Zita Lazzarini "The Global AIDS Crisis: Access to HIV Drugs : Are We 
Changing the Two World Paradigm?" (2002) 17 Conn J lnt'l L 281 , 289 & 290. 
167 See generally Zita Lazzarini "The Global AJDS Crisis: Access to HIV Drugs : Are We 
Changing the Two World Paradigm?" (2002) 17 Co1111 J Int'l L 28 1, 291. . 
168 Zita Lazzarini "The Global AIDS Crisis: Access to HIV Drugs: Are We Changmg the Two 
World Paradigm?" (2002) 17 Conn J Int ' l L 28 1, 291 & 292. 
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the diseases that ravage their people) bears testimony to their goodwill. Although 
not specifically acknowledged by the WTO in the Doha Declaration or its 
subsequent decisions, these positive steps taken by the WTO seem to signify that 
intellectual property rights are not meant to trump international human rights, 
such as the right to health, life and development. In fact, to the contrary, they 
show willingness on the WTO's part to harmonise the two international rights. 
However, notwithstanding the Doha Declaration and its subsequent 
decisions, one scholar is of the view that these efforts by the WTO to reconcile the 
TRIPS Agreement and human rights are merely rhetorical. The scholar is further 
of the opinion that: 169 
No body has gone so far as to say that trade law generally, or the TRIPS 
Agreement, must defer to human rights laws, but some headway has been 
made on the need at least to reconcile the two. The Doha Declaration that 
followed the World Trade Organization's meeting in Doha, Qatar, generally 
made reference to protecting public health. It does not state, as it should 
have, the WTO would interpret trade law consistently with human rights 
law. But the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which also 
consists of country representatives, has passed resolutions stating that that 
members of international organizations - which would of course include the 
WTO - should interpret the TRIPS agreement so that it is "part of the wider 
national and international action" to address the grave public health 
problems in developing countries, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria." 
The scholar also opines that it is clearly incumbent on the WTO to take the 
next step beyond a vague commitment to public health to assure that its 
interpretations of trade agreements are consistent with international human rights 
law, including the right to health and its requirement of making essential 
medicines available. These interpretations should both harmonise the right to have 
access to essential medications with the protection of patent rights and, more 
broadly, assure that trade agreements are consistent with human rights 
I69 Leonard s Rubenstein "Human Rights And Fair Access To Medication" (2003) 17 Emory lnt ' l 
L Rev 525, 533. 
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obligations. 170 
VI. ROLE OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION IN IMPROVING 
ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS TREATMENT 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) was established on 7 April 1948 
by the United Nations (UN), in furtherance of the UN's mission to promote peace, 
human right and social justice. The WHO's goal, as set out in its Constitution, is 
the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. 171 In order to 
achieve that objective, many functions of the WHO are promulgated in the 
Constitution, including functions such as: i) to promote cooperation among 
scientific and professional groups which contribute to the advancement of 
health; 172 ii) to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make 
recommendations with respect to international health matters; 
173 iii) to promote 
and conduct research in the field of health; 174 iv) to develop, establish and 
promote international standards with respect to food, biological, pharmaceutical 
d . ·1 d 175 an s1m1 ar pro ucts. 
The development of the WHO included a blueprint of health that 
emphasised making essential medical treatment universally accessible to people 
by acceptable means. In particular, the blueprint aimed at having full participation 
at a cost affordable to each community and country. According to one article, all 
of the WHO's 191 member states have agreed that health is a human right, and are 
. . t· 1 d 176 therefore committed to promotmg access to essen ia rugs. 
170 Leonard s Rubenstein "Human Rights And Fair Access To Medication" (2003) 17 Emory Int'l 
L Rev 525, 533 . 
17 1 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, Article I. 
172 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, A1 icle 2(j). 
173 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, Article 2(k). 
174 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, Article 2(11). 
175 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, Article 2(u). 
176 See oenerally Mary K Schug "Promoting Access To HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals In Sub-
Sahara; Africa Within The Framework Of International Intellectual Property Law" (2001) 19 Law 
& lneq J 229, 244 & 245. 
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The WHO (together with the UN) has been instrumental in bringing the 
HIV/AIDS crisis to the forefront of the international agenda and in promoting 
access to medication. However, although the WHO has taken a lead role in 
promoting access to medications, their goal for universally accessible primary 
health care is far from being realised. While globalisation leads to increased 
access for some, this is not true for most of the developing world. According to 
the figures provided by the WHO, 177 as at November 2003, an estimated 4.4 
million adults in the African region are in dire need of Antiretroviral (ARY) 
treatment. Out of this number, only 100,000 are currently on ARY treatment, 
bringing the percentage of coverage to a mere two percent. 
Therefore, bringing down prices is necessary to provide access to essential 
medicines. One commentator opines, however, that any solution the WHO 
promotes will balance intellectual property rights with the urgency of providing 
essential medicines to the developing world, because the WHO recognises the 
TRIPS Agreement. 178 
It is evident that the WHO must play a leading role in adoption, 
interpretation and enforcement of any international agreements directly effecting 
international public health. The WTO alone does not have the expertise to 
represent and address health concerns. Thus, it is vital that the WTO embrace 
cooperation with the WHO. According to one commentator, although the WHO 
attended the WTO Seattle round of trade negotiations, it was present "not as a 
participant - but as an active and vocal observer". 179 Where the WTO trade 
negotiations have a direct impact on public health issues, it is important for the 
WHO to be present at such negotiations (as a participant and not merely as an 
observer) and play an active role in structuring the trade agreements resulting 
from such negotiations. 
177 See the WHO ' s website on 'The 3 by 5 Initiative ', Coverage and need for antiretroviral 
treatment, available at <http: iiwww.who. int13bv5icovcra 0 c/c'I]!> (last accessed I December 2003). 
178 Mary K Schug "Promoting Access To HIV/ALDS Pharmaceuticals In Sub-Saharan Africa 
Within The Framework Ofinternational Intellectual Property Law" (2001) 19 Law & Ineq J 229, 
245. 
179 Kara M Bombach "Can South Africa Fight AIDS? Reconciling The South African Medicines 
And Related Substances Act With The TRlPS Agreement" (2001) 19 B U Int ' l L J 273 ,304 . 
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The WHO should also be given a role in the WTO dispute settlement 
system, especially where trade agreement disputes between member nations 
involve matters of international public health. The WHO, as a specialised health 
institution, is in a very good position to give expert evidence on international 
public health matters. Currently, as pointed out above in Part V(A) above, the 
involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is limited to submitting 
amicus curiae briefs in disputes brought before the WTO dispute settlement body. 
However, this might change in the near future, as the entire WTO dispute 
settlement system is being reviewed. 180 The outcome of the review is expected to 
be revealed by May 2004. 181 
As pointed out above, the WHO conducted a joint study, with the WTO, of 
the relationship between trade rules and public health. The study highlighted areas 
where trade and health linkages deserve more careful analysis. It also highlighted 
benefits that are possible when trade and health officials work closely together. 182 
The study seems to indicate that in the future, health and trade policy-makers will 
be cooperating closely with each other to ensure coherence between their different 
areas of responsibility. 
With regards to access to HIV/AIDS drugs, the WHO has unveiled its 
global plan to ensure that HIV/ AIDS victims in third world/developing countries 
gain full access to ARY treatment. The global plan is to treat 3 million people 
living with HIV/AIDS by the year 2005. This plan is known as the '3 by 5 
initiative'. The Director General of WHO has stated that "Lack of access to 
antiretroviral treatment is a global health emergency ... To deliver antiretroviral 
treatment to the millions who need it, we must change the way we think and 
change the way we act." Reaching the 3 by 5 target demands new commitment 
and a new way of working across the global health community. Countiies are on 
the front lines of the struggle, but they cannot succeed alone. Intensive, 
collaborative mobilisation linking countries, multilateral organisations (including 
180 See the WTO 's website page on dispute settlement, available at 
<htlp> i WWI\. wto.org!cnglishitratop c 'dispu chlispu c.htm#ncgotiat1ons> (last accessed 20 
February 2004). 
181 See the WTO 's website page on di spute settlement, above. 
182 WTO News: 2002 Press Releases, Press/310 (20 August 2002). 
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phannaceutical corporations), bilateral agencies, communities and the non-state 
sector is required.183 
Although the WHO's 3 by 5 initiative is welcomed by most quarters, one 
particular non-governmental organisation, namely Doctors Without Borders 
(DWB), have criticised the WHO's target price for treatment in its plan to fight 
HIV/AIDS. According to DWB, the WHO's HIV/AIDS drugs treatment target 
price of $400 per patient per year for 2004 lacks ambition and does not reflect 
prices that are currently available. DWB, through their AIDS programmes, 
currently treats 9000 patients, at the price of $140 per patient per year. DWB uses 
drugs manufactured by a generic pharmaceutical company, Cipla, in their 
treatment programmes. The quality of HIV/AIDS drugs manufactured by Cipla 
has been assured by the WHO pre-qualification process. 184 
Lastly, it is recommended that the WHO take a lead role in initiating 
research into poverty-related diseases and health service delivery. The WHO 
should be empowered to legislate on health issues, including the development of 
new life saving drugs and medical treatment. Further, the WHO should assist poor 
countries to procure affordable drugs through the implementation of a strong 
generic drug policy, bulk purchasing, negotiations with pharmaceutical companies 
and adequate financing. 
In fact, the WHO is already taking steps in that direction. In May 2003, the 
World Health Assembly (the supreme decision-making body for the WHO) 
passed a resolution, announcing its intention to establish a time-limited body 
known as the Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public 
Health. 185 The body will review the interfaces and linkages between intellectual 
property rights, innovation and public health in the light of current evidence and 
examine in depth how to stimulate the creation of new medicines and other 
183 See the WHO 3 by 5 Strategy at 
<!illR://www. who. i 11 1,Jb.y_S/ ubl icat ionshlocumcnlsicn!Trcatind mi II ionhv200j.!l(l I> (las t accessed 
22 December 2003). 
184 See Doctors Without Borders website, MSF-USA: Press Release 12/01 /2003, ava il able at 
<l1rt :I'\\ ww .doctorswithQuthordcrs.o_[&I)r. 2003 i 1 ]_-f~l -2003.shtml> (las t accessed 25 Febrnary 
2004) . 
185 See Resolution o f the World Health Assembly, WHA5 6.27 (28 May 2003). 
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products for diseases that mainly affect developing countries. Its analysis will take 
into account of how intellectual property rights can promote innovation relevant 
to public health, and how funding and other incentive mechanisms, including 
institutional arrangements, may contribute to this end. 186 The Commission was 
officially formed on 12 February 2004. Its members include, amongst others, 
doctors, economists and trade policy experts. 187 
VIL CONCLUSION 
It is now without doubt that access to HIV/ AIDS treatment is recognised 
by the international community as being fundamental to the realisation of the 
human right to health. 188 Whilst intellectual property rights are important to the 
research and development of HIV/ AIDS drugs, and deserve protection, they are 
not being allowed to trump human rights, in particular the human right to health. 
Property rights have been limited to the degree necessary to protect the public 
health and general welfare in democratic societies. As discussed above, 
mechanisms already exist that caters for the modification of intellectual property 
rights without abrogating the right to property or without removing incentives to 
innovation or without threatening the research and development of new drugs.
189 
Mechanisms such as compulsory licensing and parallel importing (as 
discussed above) have been officially sanctioned by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in the Doha Declaration. In order to combat this wide spread disease by 
improving access to HIV/AIDS treatment as part of their social policies, 
developing countries can now make full use of the flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Aoreement without the fear of retaliation from foreign (mainly developed) 
b ' 
countries or pharn1aceutical companies. It is highly probable that the TRIPS 
Agreement may even be amended in future to accommodate public health 
186 See Note by the Director-General of the WHO, EB 113/INF.DOC./ I ( 15 January 2004) . 
187 See the WHO Media Centre Press Release, available at 
<h!JJ.l ;/!w\\ w. who. int, rnctl iacc nt rc/rc lcascs .'2004 'pr 12/cJi> (last accessed 25 February 2004 ). 
is8 HIV/AfDS and Human Rights International Guidelines, Revised Guideline 6, available at 
<ht tg:I.\\ W\\. unhchr. ch.hi v:(!6 .pdf> (last accessed 12 February 2_004). . _ 
189 See generally Zita Lazzarini "Making Access To Pharmaceuticals A Reality : Legal Options 
Under TRIPS And The Case Of Brazil" (2003) 6 Yale H R & Dev L J 103, 138. 
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objectives of the WTO members (with special reference to developing countries) 
aimed at addressing pandemics such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
In the event of any conflict between a States' obligations under 
international trade agreements (such as the TRIPS Agreement, for example) and 
its obligations under the international law of human rights, the latter obligation(s) 
shall take precedence, and such is slowly being recognised by other States and by 
the adjudicative mechanisms of the WTO charged with interpreting those trade 
agreements. 
In view of the joint study recently conducted by the WTO and the World 
Health Organisation (WH0) 190 and other recent developments as discussed above, 
it is also highly probable that the WTO would consult the WHO before finalising 
any new international trade agreements (or amending current agreements) which 
touch and concern international public health matters. The forn1ation of the 
Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health by the WHO 
would, in future, drastically improve the input the WHO currently has in the WTO 
negotiations, especially where they involve public health issues. 
With respect to the WTO's dispute settlement process, welcomed changes 
would be the active participation of non-governmental organisations, such as 
health and/or human rights agencies and organisations, in disputes between 
member nations involving health and human right matters. Most importantly, the 
WTO panels and appellate body, before issuing their reports and decisions, should 
ensure that their decisions would not have an undesired and negative impact on 
the important social policy goals of the WTO member nations ( especially the 
developing member nations) . This can be avoided by introducing expert evidence, 
where necessary, from specialised health and/or human rights organisations, to 
guide the WTO panels and appellate body reach their ultimate decision, 
particularly in the context of HIV/ AIDS. 
190 See discuss ion in Part IV of this paper. 
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All the recent developments highlighted in this research paper, in respect 
of access to HIV/ AIDS treatment and human rights, are very encouraging and 
indeed, they set a positive tone for the future. It is just unfortunate that it took the 
HIV/ AIDS crisis to reach a catastrophic level before the international community 
realised and acknowledged that the human rights of HIV/AIDS patients includes 
the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment. As pointed out above, millions of 
lives have been lost, mainly due to the lack of access to medications and 
treatment. However, on the positive side, it is the compassion for the loss of all 
these lives that has motivated the global community to act in the way it has. As 
the saying goes, "better late than never". Hopefully, if and when a HIV vaccine is 
developed and released in the near future, intellectual property rights, patents and 
affordability will not be a barrier to access to that vaccination. As a result of the 
tremendous development in this decade, it is highly probable that the lack of 
access to HIV vaccination, once such a vaccination is developed, would not be an 
issue in the future. 
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